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Educational mismatches and skills: new
empirical tests of old hypotheses
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P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht; e-mail: m.levels@maastrichtuniversity.nl and
College for Interdisciplinary Education Research
yResearch Center for Education and the Labor Market, Maastricht University
This article empirically explores how the often reported relationship between educa-
tional mismatches and wages can best be understood. Exploiting the newly published
Programme for International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) data, we are
able to achieve a better estimation of the classical Duncan and Hoffman ORU model
than previous papers by controlling for heterogeneity of observable skills. Our findings
suggest that (i) a considerable part of the effect of educational mismatches can be
attributed to skills heterogeneity, and (ii) that the extent to which skills explain edu-
cational mismatches varies by institutional contexts, particularly the extent to which
collective wage bargaining is regulated. These observations suggest that skills matter for
explaining wage effects of education and educational mismatches, but also that the
extent to which this is the case depends on collective wage bargaining.
JEL classifications: I21, I25, J23, J24.
1. Introduction
In this article, we empirically explore how the often reported relationship between
educational mismatches and wages can best be understood. Exploiting the newly
published data from the Programme for International Assessment of Adult
Competencies PIAAC (OECD, 2013a), we are able to achieve a better estimation
of the classical ORU (over, required, under) model (Duncan and Hoffman, 1981)
by controlling for heterogeneity of observable skills. Our findings suggest that a
considerable part of the effect of educational mismatches can be attributed to skills
heterogeneity. Our observations further suggest that the extent to which skills
explain wage effects of education and educational mismatches co-depends on in-
stitutional contexts.
The incidence and wage effects of educational mismatches have been well estab-
lished by empirical studies (see Groot and Maassen van den Brink, 2000; Hartog,
2000; Green et al., 2002; Sloane, 2003; Quintini, 2011). Empirical analyses consist-
ently show that (i) people who work in jobs for which they are overqualified earn
less than workers who have the same level of education, but who work in jobs that
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require that level of education; and that (ii) overeducated people earn more than
people who work in equivalent jobs but have attained the level of schooling
required for that job (Sicherman, 1991; Hersch, 1991; Garcı´a-Serrano and Malo-
Ocan˜a, 1996; Dekker et al., 2002; Sloane, 2003). Many papers have aimed to explain
these stylized facts (Duncan and Hoffman, 1981; Hartog and Oosterbeek, 1988;
Sloane et al. 1999; McGuinness, 2006). Much of the debate has focussed on the
question of whether the match between a worker’s education and the education
required for his or her job has a distinct effect on productivity, in addition to the
effect of education itself. Many authors have proposed theoretical reasons for this
assertion, for example, citing job assignment theory (Hartog, 1977; Sattinger, 1993,
2012). Job assignment theory proposes that even if we accept that the skills
obtained in education contribute positively to productivity in general, the extent
to which workers can use those skills may depend on productivity limits imposed
by job characteristics. For overeducated workers, job constraints may allow only a
limited use of their skills. On the other side, undereducated workers may overutilize
their skills.
However, research shows that educational mismatches and skill mismatches
correlate only weakly (Allen and van der Velden, 2001; Green and McIntosh,
2007; Quintini, 2011). Two explanations have been put forward to explain the
observed effects of educational mismatches and the weak relation with skills
mismatches. First, heterogeneous skills theory (Allen and van der Velden, 2001;
Green and McIntosh, 2007) points out that considerable variation in skills exists
within educational levels. If we accept that this is the case, it is likely that relatively
high-skilled workers will tend to be sorted into more complex jobs that match their
skills better than jobs that formally require their own level of education, whilst low-
skilled workers will be sorted into less complex jobs that also provide a better match
to their actual skill levels. According to this view, the skills possessed by these
workers, rather than the mismatch they nominally experience, is what drives the
observed wage effects.
Second, Allen and van der Velden (2001) propose an alternative explanation for
the wage effects of over- and undereducation and their weak relation to skills
mismatches, namely, that it is the result of institutional regulation of the labour
market. Because workers’ skills and productivity can rarely be observed perfectly by
employers, pay rates will need to be established through some form of bargaining. It
has been forcefully argued by scholars such as Spence (1973) that under such
conditions employers aim to base workers’ wages on perceived signals of their
likely productivity with given observable characteristics (such as specific educa-
tional qualifications) working in a comparable job or performing comparable
tasks. It is usually supposed that resorting to such signals will be temporary until
better information about the worker’s actual performance becomes available.
However, when wage setting is strongly institutionalized, basing wages on formal
characteristics such as the required qualification for a given job may become a
permanent feature rather than a temporary solution in lieu of better information.
Similarly, labour laws may restrict employers’ ability to adjust wages to match
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performance or dismiss underperforming workers. If this is true, there may be
substantial wage effects of educational mismatches that cannot be explained by
individual productivity differences, whether due to differences in skills or to
poor matching between actual and required skills. If so, we would expect to
observe these ‘unexplained’ wage effects of educational mismatches to occur
more often in situations where wage-setting is more strongly affected by institu-
tional arrangements. Because not only pay rates but also job requirements in
general are more based on institutional arrangements, we would simultaneously
expect that educational mismatches occur less often in these strongly
institutionalized settings.
To date, the debate about which theory best explains the relationship between
educational mismatches and wages has been hampered by data problems (Sloane,
2003). The most important problem is that there has been no large-scale data set
that combines measures of required education and skills. Green et al. (2002) and
Quintini (2011) have used the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS); although
this data set includes good measures of skills, it lacks reliable data on required level
of education. Other data sets simply lack good measures of skills or are not large
enough to cover institutional variation across different countries. As a consequence,
most existing studies that explore the extent to which skills explain the relation
between education and wages focus on educational attainment (Denny et al., 2004;
Blau and Kahn, 2005; Hanushek and Zhang, 2006; Patrinos et al., 2006; Fasih et al.,
2012). This literature suggests that skills indeed contribute to explaining the wage
effects of acquired education, but also that there is considerable cross-country
variation that remains to be explained.
The recently collected international large-scale PIAAC data provide reliable
measurements of all the elements needed to explore the relevance of skills for
explaining wage effects of overeducation, undereducation, and required
education. More specifically, the data contain measurements of individuals’
earnings, years of acquired and required schooling, as well as direct measures of
key information processing skills. As such, PIAAC allows us to better distinguish
between the various theoretical explanations for the relationship between educa-
tional (mis)matches and wages than any previous data set. Although the measured
skills are not the perfect measure of all relevant abilities, and much skill hetero-
geneity will plausibly remain unobserved, these data can be used to establish
whether the relationships between wages and overeducation, undereducation,
and required education can partly be attributed to skills heterogeneity.
Furthermore, the cross-national character of the data allows for exploring the
role of labour market institutions.
A recent paper by Hanushek et al. (2013) also uses the PIAAC data but concen-
trates solely on the returns to skills and acquired schooling. Our contribution to the
literature is two-fold. First, we are the first to use this data set to explore to what
extent the wage effects of overeducation, undereducation, and required education
can be explained by skills across a large number of OECD countries. As indicated
earlier, previous data sets have severe limitations to assess these effects adequately.
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Second, we use this unique data set to examine to what extent institutional
conditions frame these relations.
In the next section, we formally deduce hypotheses from the abovementioned
theories. More specifically, we seek to answer the following research questions:
(i) To what extent are required education, overeducation, and undereducation
related to individual wages?
(ii) To what extent can the effects of required education, overeducation, and
undereducation on individual wages be explained by individual differences
in skills?
(iii) To what extent is there cross-national variation in the extent to which the
relationship between wages on the one hand, and required education,
overeducation, and undereducation, on the other hand, can be explained by
skills heterogeneity?
(iv) To what extent is this cross-national variation related to differences in labour
market institutions?
2. Theory and hypotheses
In a significant expansion of the classic Mincerian wage function (Mincer, 1974),
Duncan and Hoffman (1981) proposed a model that allows for distinguishing
between individuals’ attained level of education and the level of education
required in their job. In this so-called ORU model, it is possible to estimate the
effects of overeducation o, required education r and undereducation i on wages in
the following general form:
lnWi ¼ oEoi þ rEri þ uEui þ c0iþ x0iþ "i ð1Þ
in which Wi is the observed wage of individual i, Eoi is the number of years of
overeducation, Eri is the number of years of required education, and E
u
i the
number of years of undereducation. To account for unobserved heterogeneity
between countries, we include a vector with country fixed effects dummies,
denoted as c. Furthermore, x is a vector that contains control variables, such as
work experience (linear and squared), and "i is an idiosyncratic error term. To
allow for differentiation between education and skills, we expand eq. (1) with a
vector of direct observations of skills, denoted as s. The model reads:
lnWi ¼ oEoi þ rEri þ uEui þ c0iþ x0iþ s0 þ "i ð2Þ
In eq. (2), the wage returns of skills are denoted by . Note that we do not assume
that an individual’s education and skills are uncorrelated. On the contrary, we
expect that education and also control variables like family background
and work experience affect skills, but that conditional on these variables, skills
can be quite heterogeneous. By including the skills in the ORU model, we
will be able to see whether skills affect wages over and above their effect through
education.
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As described earlier, previous findings show that:
r > o > juj > 0 ð3Þ
The basic idea of this article is that the various theories that have been put forward
make different predictions about the extent to which these parameters are driven by
individual skills differences and about their cross-national variability. In the
remainder of this section, we formally derive such hypotheses. To do so, we
specify two (nested) specifications of eq. (2), one in which skills are not
controlled for, and a second specification in which skills are controlled for. For
reasons of clarity and precision, we describe the various hypotheses in logical terms
and treat the two specifications as two different conditions under which the same
model will yield different predictions. Under the first specification, all skills
variables are restricted to zero, so that s = 0. Note that under this specification,
eq. (2) collapses to the standard ORU model described in eq. (1). Under the
second specification, we put no restrictions on the skills variables in eq. (2), so
that s> 0.
Based on these specifications, we can formulate the following formal hypotheses
based on the heterogeneous skills theory. In its strongest form, the heterogeneous
skills theory leads to the following prediction:
Hypothesis 1 (strong)
ðr j s > 0Þ ¼ ðo j s > 0Þ ¼ ðjujj s > 0Þ ¼ 0 &
ð j s > 0Þ > 0
In words: after controlling for skills, we expect no significant effect of required
education, overeducation, or undereducation on wages, whilst we do expect skills
to have an effect. Note that testing this hypothesis would require that we observe all
relevant skills, which is highly improbable, if not impossible. Under these
conditions, a weaker version of this hypothesis is more realistic. This hypothesis
states that a significant part of the original relationships is explained by observed
skills. In that case the absolute values of r, o, and u are significantly lower in
eq. (2) than in eq. (1).
Hypothesis 1 (weak)
r j s > 0ð Þ < r j s ¼ 0ð Þ &
o j s > 0ð Þ < o j s ¼ 0ð Þ &
j ujj s > 0ð Þ < j u jj s ¼ 0ð Þ &
 j s > 0ð Þ > 0
To answer research questions iii and iv, we will consider eqs (1) and (2) separately
for each country. The country estimates of  in eq. (2) will provide us with an
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estimate of the extent to which skills affect wages in the different countries and
comparing r, o, and u in eqs (1) and (2) can indicate the extent to which
skills explain the wage returns to overeducation, undereducation, and required
education in each country. So let r
c be the proportion of the wage returns to
required education explained by skills in country c, o
c be the proportion of the
wage returns to overeducation explained by skills in country c, and u
c be the
proportion of the wage returns to undereducation explained by skills in country
c. Furthermore, r
c is the effect of required education on wages in country c, o
c is
the effect of overeducation on wages in country c, u
c is the effect of
undereducation on wages in country. Then, it follows that:
r
c ¼ rc j s ¼ 0ð Þ  rc j s > 0ð Þð Þ= rc j s ¼ 0ð Þ ð4aÞ
o
c ¼ oc j s ¼ 0ð Þ  oc j s > 0ð Þð Þ= oc j s ¼ 0ð Þ ð4bÞ
u
c ¼ j uc j j s ¼ 0ð Þ  j uc j j s > 0ð Þð Þ= j uc j j s ¼ 0ð Þ ð4cÞ
We can then answer research question iv with the following equations:
c ¼ l0 þ lsCWBc þ "c ð5aÞ
r
c ¼ l0 þ lrCWBc þ "c ð5bÞ
o
c ¼ l0 þ loCWBc þ "c ð5cÞ
u
c ¼ l0 þ luCWBc þ "c ð5dÞ
in which CWBc is a variable measuring the prevalence of collective wage bargain-
ing in country c and "c is an idiosyncratic error term. The parameter lo is an
intercept, ls is the relationship between collective wage bargaining and the wage
returns to skills by country, denoted by c. Parameters lr, lo, and lu denote
the relationship between collective wage bargaining and the extent to which wage
returns to required education, overeducation, and undereducation are ex-
plained by skills. Following the previous discussion on institutional theory, we
predict that:
Hypothesis 2
2að Þls < 0 &
2bð Þlo < 0 &
2cð Þlr < 0 &
2dð Þlu < 0
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In words: we expect the country-specific effects of skills on wages to be negatively
related to countries’ collective wage bargaining (CWB): in countries with stronger
collective wage bargaining, skills have lower effects on wages (hypothesis 2a).
Moreover we expect that the country-specific proportion of the effects of
required education, overeducation, and undereducation that is explained by skills
are negatively related to the country’s CWB (hypotheses 2b–d). In countries in
which collective wage bargaining is more prevalent, education-related wage differ-
entials should be less strongly explained by skills.
3. Data and measurements
The data we use for the analyses come from the PIAAC survey, collected by the
OECD (2013a) in 24 highly industrialized countries. The survey is designed to
provide valid and reliable estimates of adults’ competences in key information-
processing skills; to identify proficiency differences between subgroups of the
population; to understand development, maintenance, and use of skills; as well
as to determine the impact of proficiency levels on life chances (OECD, 2013a).
National samples contain over 5,000 adults between the age of 16 and 65.
Respondents were interviewed using computer-assisted personal interviews,
although for the testing pencil-and-paper data collection strategies were also
used. The data hold information on demographic and socio-economic
background characteristics, as well as on skills use in the work place and at
home. They contain direct measurements of skills. Respondents were given
assessment tests designed to directly measure their cognitive skills in various
domains. More specifically, these tests measured numerical and literacy skills, as
well as respondents’ capacity to solve problems in technology-rich environments.
For detailed information on the scaling procedures and reliability of the tests, we
refer to the technical report (OECD, 2013b).
To prepare the data for our analyses, we made a number of selections. First,
we only selected males who were employed full-time. This was based on the
reported number of usual working hours per week. Full-time workers are
defined as workers with a minimum of 36 working hours a week. To avoid
outliers, we excluded everybody reporting more than 80 working hours a week.
We excluded those who were self-employed, people who served in the armed
forces, and unpaid family workers. We also excluded people who indicated
that their primary status was student or internship. To avoid outliers in the wage
distribution we excluded the top and bottom 1% in each country. We excluded
France and Russia, as these data were not yet available, as well as Australia, which
has put restrictions on the use of the data. The working sample consists of some
1,200 cases in most countries. In Canada the sample existed of 6,069 cases, from
which we took a random sample of 20%, resulting in NCanada = 1,190 cases to
reduce possible bias due to oversampling of Canadian respondents. Missing
values were deleted listwise. The total working sample contains N= 26,322
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respondents from 21 countries. A detailed overview of the sample selection is
presented in Appendix 1.
3.1 Measurements
Below, we discuss the measurement of the variables we use. An overview of de-
scriptive statistics of all the variables in our model is given in Table 1.
3.1.1 Wages As our dependent variable, we use the natural logarithm of the
monthly wage, adjusted for purchasing power parity to account for cross-
national differences. Respondents in the top and bottom 1% on this variable in
each country are omitted from the analyses to avoid outliers. Monthly wages in our
data set range from US$513 to US$213,198. The mean wage is US$3,490.
3.1.2 Educational attainment Educational attainment is measured in PIAAC in
the nominal number of years respondents have spent in formal education. The
measure is derived from the reported highest level of education in national
education systems, converted into nominal years of schooling by the PIAAC
consortium and country experts (OECD, 2013b).
3.1.3 Required education The PIAAC questionnaire contains a question asking
respondents what education level they thought was required for their current
jobs. Verbatim, this question was: ‘If applying today, what would be the usual
qualifications, if any, that someone would need to get this type of job’? Based on
the answers respondents gave to this question and information about national
education systems, this was converted into a cross-nationally comparable
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Minimum Maximum Mean SD
Numeracy skills 80.39 420.24 284.34 47.11
Literacy skills 78.86 415.64 281.20 42.92
Monthly wage (US$) 512.90 213,198.31 3,490.01 3,497.65
Required education 0 22 12.93 3.13
Overeducation 0 18 0.89 1.78
Undereducation 0 14 0.51 1.27
Work experience 0 55 19.87 12.18
Number of working hours per week 36 80 43.89 7.53
1st-generation migrants 0 1 0.08 0.27
1.5-generation migrants 0 1 0.01 0.09
2nd-generation migrants 0 1 0.02 0.13
2.5-generation migrants 0 1 0.05 0.21
Remigrants 0 1 0.01 0.09
Highest level of mothers’ or fathers’ education 1 3 1.90 0.75
Note: N= 26,322.
Source: PIAAC.
966 educational mismatches and skills
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/oep/article-abstract/66/4/959/2362187 by U
niversiteit M
aastricht user on 06 August 2019
measure of nominal years of formal education needed to get the job (OECD,
2013b). The measure ranges from 0 to 22 years, with a mean of 12.9 years.1
3.1.4 Overeducation Our measure is derived from the measures of respondents’
educational attainment and the education level required for their job. Following the
usual operational definition we define the extent of overeducation as:
EO ¼ EA  ER if EA > ER
and
EO ¼ 0 if EA  ER
where respondents’ educational attainment in years of schooling is EA and EO 0.
3.1.5 Undereducation Similarly, we define the extent of undereducation as:
EU ¼ ER  EA if ER > EA
and
EU ¼ 0 if ER  EA
with EU 0.
3.1.6 Skills PIAAC contains measures of three types of skills—literacy skills,
numeracy skills, and skills related to problem solving in technology-rich environ-
ments (OECD, 2013a). All three skills measures are constructed using adaptive
testing; plausible values are calculated using item response theory (IRT). The
tests on problem solving in technology-rich environments were only presented to
people who reported they had at least some computer experience, were willing to
take the computer-based assessment, and had at least minimum levels of computer
abilities. Including these tests would nonrandomly reduce our sample size with
almost 33%. We therefore restrict ourselves to the measurements of numeracy
and literacy to operationalize skills. As the skill proficiencies of literacy and
numeracy are highly correlated (r= 0.905) we only use numeracy for the analysis.
The OECD (2013b) defines numeracy as ‘the ability to access, use, interpret and
communicate mathematical information and ideas in order to engage in and
manage the mathematical demands of a range of situations in adult life’.
The tests of numeracy measure how well respondents are able to use mathematical
information to solve problems that might actually occur in real life. Numeracy is
measured with 10 plausible values. We use the first of the reported plausible values
as an indication of the numeracy skills of individuals.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
1 In Appendix 2, we present the distribution of people in jobs who reported that their job required no
education over occupational groups. As can be noted, only 0.2% of the workers reported that no
education was needed, most of them in the lower ISCO categories.
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3.1.7 Work experience We also control for the effect work experience has on
wages by including the total numbers of years respondents reported to have had
paid work during their lifetime in a linear and a quadratic term.
3.1.8 Working hours Although we select people working full-time (defined as
36 hours or more), there is still considerable variation in number of working
hours. Therefore we control for the number of hours individuals weekly work in
their current job. As already indicated, we excluded respondents reporting to work
more than 80 hours a week to avoid outliers. The mean number of hours worked is
43.89.
3.1.9 Immigration status Migrants have a wage penalty related to their migrant
status (see, e.g., Chiswick, 1978). Moreover, both overeducation and
undereducation have differing interpretations for migrants. Overeducation can
partly be linked to problematic transferability of human capital, whilst
undereducation might be explained by favourable self-selection of immigrants
(Chiswick and Miller, 2008). To reduce noise related to the different interpretations
of ORU with immigrants, we control for immigrant status. We use dummies to
distinguish first-generation immigrants (both parents and respondent were foreign-
born), 1.5-generation immigrants (respondent and one parent foreign-born, one
parent born in test country), second-generation immigrants (both parents foreign-
born, respondent born in test country), 2.5-generation immigrant (respondent and
one parent born in test country, one parent foreign-born), and remigrants (i.e.,
respondent foreign-born, both parents non–foreign-born). People without an
observed history of migration are the reference category.
3.1.10 Socioeconomic origin In general, it might be expected that people with
higher socioeconomic background end up in higher quality and better paying
jobs, all else being equal. Parents with a higher socioeconomic status are also
more likely to have children with higher cognitive abilities (Hanushek and
Woessmann, 2011). We use dummies to control for the effects of socioeconomic
origin class, distinguishing people with lower educated (ISCED 1 or 2) parents
(reference) from those with medium educated (ISCED 3 or 4) or higher
educated (ISCED 5 or 6) parents. We take the highest education level of father
or mother (whichever is the highest).
3.1.11 Country fixed effects We control for unobserved heterogeneity between
countries by including country dummies. Austria is the reference category.
3.1.12 Collective wage bargaining (CWB) To measure the extent to which
collective bargaining affects wage setting in countries, we use the OECD measure
of the percentage of countries’ workforces covered by collective agreements.
It ranges from 12 (Korea) to 99 (Austria). Data were taken from Venn (2009,
pp. 17–18).
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4. Analyses and results
In Table 2 we present our explanatory analyses, using numeracy test scores as proxies
for workers’ skills. In Model 1 we follow the classical Duncan and Hoffman (1981)
ORU model, as described in eq. (1). In Model 2 we estimate an extended version of
this model by including the numeracy skills. This model follows eq. (2).
The results of Model 1 are in line with previous findings. First, the relationship
between required years of schooling and wages is positive. The strength of the
relationship (r = 0.078) indicates that each additional year of required schooling
yields a wage premium of some 8%. The effect of overeducation is less than half
that size, with an estimate of o = 0.032. Having more education than is required for
a job pays off but not as much as the years of required education for that job. Each
additional year of education more than is strictly required yields a wage premium
of some 3%. Undereducation is negatively related to wages (u = –0.019). The
absolute effect size is smaller than the effect size of overeducation. Each year of
undereducation yields a wage penalty of some 2%.
In Model 2, the proficiency score on numeracy skills is added to the model.
Numeracy skills ( = 0.138) are positively related to wages. If we compare the
standardized effects, the effect size (standardized parameter = 0.119) is around
one third of the effect of required education (standardized parameter = 0.361).
Compared to Model 1, the relationship between required education and wages is
reduced with 15% to r = 0.067. We can also see that the effect of overschooling is
reduced with 25% to o = 0.024. Differences in numeracy skills account for 38% of
the effect of underschooling as observed in Model 1.2
Table 2 ORU model: regression required education, overeducation, and
undereducation on log earnings
Model 1
...............................................
Model 2
...............................................
B  B 
Intercept 6.247*** 6.003***
ORU
Required education (r) 0.078*** 0.422*** 0.067*** 0.361***
Overeducation (o) 0.032*** 0.099*** 0.024*** 0.074***
Undereducation (u) 0.019*** 0.042*** 0.012*** 0.027***
Numeracy skills (/100) 0.138*** 0.119***
Controlsa Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R2 0.594 0.603
Notes: Presented parameters are unstandardized (B) and standardized () OLS regression coefficients.
***p< 0.001; **p< 0.01; *p< 0.05.
aEstimates for control variables in Appendix 3.
Source: PIAAC.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
2 Please note that our model by definition constrains the parameters across countries to be the same.
This is taken up in Table 5, where we provide the results per country.
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How do these findings bear on the hypotheses we formulated? The strong version
of the heterogeneous skills theory predicted that after controlling for skills, there
would be no residual effect of required education, overeducation, and
undereducation on wages. That is clearly not the case. However, the results do
clearly show that a significant part of all three effects can be explained by skills,
suggesting that the weaker version of the heterogeneous skills theory is supported
by the data.
Before we continue to draw conclusions, we test the sensitivity of these main
conclusions to sample selection and alternative model specifications. In Tables 3
and 4, we present alternative model specifications to test whether our results are
robust. First, it should be noted that we measure only a subset of people’s actual
skills. It might be the case that higher level jobs less strongly require a high pro-
ficiency in elementary numeracy skills and more strongly demand skills we do not
observe. As such, it might be the case that the extent to which skills explain ORU
differ for different types of jobs. We reran the original analyses on subsets of both
people in higher skilled (ISCO08> 3) and lower skilled (ISCO08 3) jobs. The
results are presented in the first four models of Table 3. Although the coefficients
differ somewhat in strength, our main conclusions are unaffected.
Second, the use of years of schooling as a measure for education (and, by con-
sequence, for overeducation and undereducation) in cross-national analyses could
be criticized. The main assumption when using this variable is that each year of
education has a similar effect on skills within a country (and in Table 2 also across
countries). But a year of tertiary education may have a different impact on the
acquisition of skills than a year of pre-college education. Using dummies indicating
the different ISCED levels might be a way out. Although the ISCED-classification
certainly also raises problems of comparability (for an extensive discussion see
Schneider, 2009), this critique directly pertains to the construct validity of our
most important measures. In Table 3 we therefore present an alternative specifica-
tion to Models 1 and 2, using ISCED-levels to indicate the acquired and required
level of education. In this specification, we classified overeducation and
undereducation as follows. First we assessed the respondent’s own level of
education distinguishing lower education (ISCED 1 and 2; the reference
category), medium education (ISCED 3 and 4), and higher education (ISCED 5
and 6). Then, we compared this education level with the education level their job
requires and use dummies to signify overeducation (i.e., their educational
attainment is higher than their job demands) and undereducation (i.e., their
education is lower than their job demands). The interpretation of the coefficients
deviates slightly from the interpretation of Models 1 and 2. Now, the coefficient for
overeducation represents the wage effect of being overeducated compared to those
with a similar level of education, but who are working in a job that matches their
education level and therefore has an opposite sign compared to the same coefficient
in eqs (1) and (2). The same applies for the coefficient for undereducation, that
now signifies the wage difference between people who are undereducated and those
who have a similar education level but have a job at the right level of education. The
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alternative analysis supports our main conclusions, namely, that heterogeneous
skills partly drive the effects of educational mismatches.
Another issue is that our model assumes stability in the relationship between
education and skills over time. This is not necessarily the case. A year of schooling
for a cohort that attended school in the 1960s or 1970s may have yielded more or
less skills than a year of schooling for a cohort that attended school in the 1980s or
1990s due to changes in the quality of instruction over time. In Table 4 we estimate
the same models again separately for the older (41 and older) and the younger
(16–40-year-olds) cohort. This does not affect the main results.
Finally, the sample of our original analyses was restricted to full-time working
males. In Table 4 we have added a robustness check running the original model
specification on a sample of full-time working females. Again the results do not
basically change.3
Table 3 Robustness checks for Models 1 and 2 in Table 2
Alternative
specification with
only low-status
jobs
...................................
Alternative
specification with
only high-status
jobs
...................................
Alternative
specification with
different measurement
of ORU
.......................................
Model
1(a)
Model
2(a)
Model
1(b)
Model
2(b)
Model
1(c)
Model
2(c)
Intercept 6.612*** 6.428*** 6.379*** 6.059*** 7.040*** 6.552***
0.030 0.033 0.036 0.041 0.021 0.025
Required education (years) 0.051*** 0.043*** 0.070*** 0.061***
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Overeducation (years) 0.016*** 0.010*** 0.028*** 0.022***
0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003
Undereducation (years) 0.012*** 0.006* 0.018*** 0.012***
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Middle educated (ISCED) 0.081*** 0.038***
0.008 0.008
Higher educated (ISCED) 0.418*** 0.313***
0.009 0.009
Overeducated (ISCED) 0.195*** 0.175***
0.007 0.006
Undereducation (ISCED) 0.159*** 0.137***
0.008 0.008
Numeracy skills 0.103*** 0.144*** 0.195***
0.007 0.009 0.005
Controlsa Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: ***p< 0.001; **p< 0.01; *p< 0.05. Standard errors in italics. aEstimates for control variables in
Appendix 4.
Source: PIAAC.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
3 Overeducation may be a particular problem for those who fail to find full-time work, and we may be
missing a group of people for whom overeducation and inability to find full-time work are related. We
have considered looking at part-time workers as well, but decided against it in this article. The
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Our main conclusions are largely insensitive to changing measurement of the
relevant variables and to subsampling of higher and lower status jobs, older and
younger cohorts or women instead of men. This suggests our conclusions are
reasonably robust. There are, however, three additional remarks that are relevant
here. First, it must be noted that we do not observe all skills that are relevant in
theory, and it is more than likely that the relationship between overeducation and
skills would be even further reduced if we would be able to control for the now
unobserved skills. In other words, our test of the heterogeneous skills theory is
highly conservative.
Second, the expectation that it would be possible to explain all the wage variance
that is related to required education, overeducation, and undereducation pre-
supposes that employers are perfectly informed about all the relevant skills and
other productive attributes of workers. This seems unrealistic. In practice, it is very
plausible that there is at least some uncertainty, and as a consequence there will be
some tendency to assign wages based on observable features of workers and jobs
Table 4 Robustness checks for Models 1 and 2 in Table 2
Alternative
specification with
only people
younger than 40
....................................
Alternative
specification
with only people
of 40 years or older
....................................
Original
specification
ran on fulltime
working women
....................................
Model
1(d)
Model
2(d)
Model
1(e)
Model
2(e)
Model
1(f)
Model
2(f)
Intercept 6.248*** 6.045*** 6.350*** 6.106*** 6.019*** 5.774***
0.032 0.034 0.041 0.042 0.024 0.027
Required education (years) 0.071*** 0.062*** 0.085*** 0.071*** 0.084*** 0.075***
0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Overeducation (years) 0.035*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.020*** 0.038*** 0.031***
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Undereducation (years) 0.027*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.013*** 0.028*** 0.022***
0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002***
Middle educated (ISCED)
Higher educated (ISCED)
Overeducated (ISCED)
Undereducation (ISCED)
Numeracy skills 0.115*** 0.158*** 0.135***
0.008 0.008 0.006
Controlsa Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: ***p< 0.001; **p< 0.01; *p< 0.05. Standard errors in italic.
aEstimates for control variables in Appendix 4.
Source: PIAAC.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
opportunities for part-time work also vary considerably across countries and might as such distort the
interpretation of the findings. We plan to take this issue up in a separate publication.
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rather than entirely on actual productive skills. Consequently, even if we possessed
the perfect knowledge that most employers lack, in the form of a precise measure-
ment of all relevant skills, the strong version of the heterogeneous skills theory is
unlikely to be fully confirmed. There will be some residual effect indicating that
people are rewarded partly based on easily observable features such as education
and job titles.
This leads directly on to the third point, which is that we would expect the size of
this residual effect of formal characteristics to depend to a large extent on the
particular institutional arrangements that prevail in a country. One implicit
assumption underlying our specification of the classical ORU model in Models 1
and 2 is that both the effects of skills and the extent to which skills explain wage
effects of overeducation and undereducation do not differ cross-nationally.
However, as we argued, such heterogeneity of effects can theoretically be
expected. In countries in which wage setting is largely a matter that is decided
between employer and employee, with little regard needing to be paid to laws and
institutions designed to protect workers’ rights, we would expect the residual effect
of formal characteristics to be quite small and largely transient. However, in
countries in which protectionist labour market laws and institutions play an
important role, we would expect the residual effect to be far larger and more
permanent. This is precisely the point of our second hypothesis, and we now
turn to it.
Based on institutional theory, we posited the hypothesis that the extent to which
individual skills affect wages over and above the effects of required education,
overeducation, and undereducation is larger in countries in which collective
bargaining is less prevalent. Moreover, we hypothesized that the extent to which
skills can explain the relationship between required education, overeducation, and
undereducation on the one hand and wages on the other hand is larger in countries
in which collective bargaining is less prevalent. To test these hypotheses, we relaxed
the assumption of cross-national homogeneity of effects and examined cross-
national variation in the effects of skills on wages and on the proportion of the
wage effects of required education, overeducation, and undereducation that can be
attributed to skills. To establish this proportion for each country, we ran the model
specified in eq. (2) separately for each country. In the first column of Table 5, we
present the country scores on the collective bargaining scale. In the second column,
we present the wage effects of skills in each country according to eq. (2). Full
models are presented in Appendix 5. There is indeed considerable cross-national
variation in the effect of numeracy skills on wages, ranging from a low and non-
significant 0.047 in the Czech Republic to a high 0.225 in Germany.
Figure 1 presents the country-level relationship between collective wage
bargaining and the wage returns to numeracy skills. On the x-axis of the graph,
we have ordered countries according to the extent to which wages are set collect-
ively. The index holds information about the percentage of the total workforce in
countries that is covered by collective bargaining processes. On the y-axis the
countries are ordered based on the effect of numeracy skills on wages. The figure
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shows that the wage returns to skills are indeed lower in countries with a stronger
collective agreement coverage.
Table 5 also presents information about country differences in the extent to
which skills explain the correlation between wages and required years of
schooling, overeducation, and undereducation. The table shows that large cross-
national variation exists. In Canada (17%), the USA (18%), Poland (18%),
Germany (19%), Japan (20%), and Estonia (25%), skills are important explan-
ations for the returns to required education. In contrast, in Cyprus (4%), the
Czech Republic (6%), and the Slovak Republic (5%), skills contribute much less
to the explanation of the relation between required education and wages. In Ireland
(34%) and Japan (61%), skills explain (nearly) all of the returns to overeducation,
as the effects of overeducation on wages are no longer significant. In the USA, more
than half of the association between overeducation and wages can be explained by
skills. In Cyprus and the Slovak and Czech Republics barely any of this effect is
explained by skills. In Japan, Sweden, Canada, and Poland, the relation between
Table 5 ORU model by country: returns to skills; returns to required education,
overeducation, and undereducation on ln(earnings); and the proportion of effects
explained by skills
CWB  % ar % 
a
o % 
a
u
interpeted by  interpeted by  interpeted by 
Austria 99 0.150*** 12 13 n/ay
Belgium 96 0.103*** 15 14 20
Canada 32 0.139*** 17 22 286¼
Cyprus n/az 0.055 4 9 11
Czech Republic 44 0.047 6 10 n/ay
Denmark 82 0.085*** 10 18 n/ay
Estonia 22 0.201*** 25 n/ay n/ay
Finland 90 0.073*** 8 15 8
Germany 63 0.225*** 19 35 n/ay
Ireland n/az 0.171*** 16 346¼ 29
Italy 80 0.092*** 10 24 22
Japan 16 0.224*** 20 616¼ 496¼
Korea 12 0.118*** 11 17 14
Netherlands 82 0.126*** 12 23 23
Norway 72 0.107*** 14 18 19
Poland 35 0.143*** 18 34 476¼
Slovak Republic 35 0.061 5 6 n/ay
Spain 80 0.078*** 8 20 8
Sweden 92 0.093*** 13 28 296¼
UK 35 0.214*** 16 39 32
USA 13 0.197*** 18 51 26
Notes: ***p< 0.001; **p< 0.01; *p< 0.05.
zNo macro data available.
yNo effects to explain as the original association does not significantly deviate from zero.
6¼Association becomes insignificant after controlling for skills.
Source: PIAAC.
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undereducation and wages is fully explained by skills. On the other hand, the
proportion of the wage effect of undereducation that is explained by skills is very
low in Finland (8%), Cyprus (11%), and Spain (8%).
Figure 2 shows how collective wage bargaining in countries is related to the
extent to which wage effects of required education, overeducation, and
undereducation are explained by skills. On the horizontal axis, we ordered
countries according to the extent to which employees are covered by CWB. On
the y-axis the countries are ordered based on the extent to which the relationship
between required education (top panel), overeducation (middle panel), and
undereducation (bottom panel) can be explained by individuals’ skills.
In the top panel of Fig. 2 we can see that the extent to which the wage effects of
required education are explained by skills is somewhat stronger in the low CWB
countries than in the strong CWB countries. The middle panel of Fig. 2 shows a
somewhat stronger negative relationship between CWB and the extent to which
skills can explain the relationship between overeducation and wages, which is in
line with the institutional hypothesis. It indicates that in strong CWB countries
the wage effects of overeducation are less driven by skills than in low CWB
countries. Furthermore, the overall proportions that are explained in each
country are higher and the relation is somewhat stronger than is the case for
required education. The bottom panel shows that there is also a negative relation
between CWB and the extent to which the wage effect of undereducation is
explained by skills. This indicates that the wage effects of undereducation are
more strongly driven by skills in the high CWB countries, which supports the
institutional theory.
It would seem that as institutional theory predicts, individuals’ skills are less
rewarded in countries in which wage setting is more strongly collectivized. Also,
Fig. 1 Country-level relationship between labour market institutions and the effect
of numeracy skills of earnings.
Source: PIAAC.
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it seems that ORU effects are more strongly driven by skills in countries with lower
levels of CWB.4 Figure 2 further suggests two things. First, the effects of
Fig. 2 Relationship between collective wage bargaining and the extent to which
effects of required education, overeducation, and undereducation on log-earnings
in these countries are explained by skills.
Source: PIAAC.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
4 In Appendix 6, we present figures on the country-level relationship between collective wage bargaining
on the one hand, and GDP per capita and the proportion of higher status jobs on the other. We also
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overeducation and undereducation are more strongly related to skills than is the
case for required schooling, for both low- and high-CWB countries. Second, even
in strong CWB countries some of the wage effects of required education are at least
partly explained by underlying differences in skill levels. Taking into account that
this is a conservative estimate of the effect of skills, the real explanatory effect of
skills in these countries might be much higher. This could reflect the fact that in
CWB one of the arguments for assigning higher wages to higher educational levels
is based on the presumed higher skills levels.
5. Conclusions and discussion
In this article, we have aimed to shed further light on explanations for the well-
established relationship between overeducation, undereducation, and earnings.
Using new empirical data (OECD, 2013a), we were able to estimate the classical
ORU-model whilst controlling for heterogeneity of observable skills. This allowed
us to address four research questions.
First, we asked to what extent required education, overeducation, and
undereducation are related to individual wages. Our findings are in line with
earlier studies showing that the wage effects of overeducation are almost half of
the wage effects of required education and that the (absolute) wage effect for
undereducation is even lower than the wage effect for overeducation.
Second, we asked to what extent the effects of required education, overeducation,
and undereducation on individual wages can be explained by individual differences
in skills. Our analyses show that skills heterogeneity contributes considerably to the
explanation of educational mismatch. The effect of numeracy skills on wages
explains some 15% of the wage effect of required education, a quarter of the
wage effect of overeducation, and over one third of the wage effect of
undereducation. Considering that we only use one measure of one observable
skill, these effects are in fact quite high. One can easily imagine that much more
could be explained if we could have measured all relevant skills. At least we can
conclude that part of the educational mismatches is just apparent and that
mismatches do not necessarily imply that workers’ skills are heavily underutilized
or overutilized. The incidence of undereducation and overeducation in these cases
can be interpreted as an adjustment by the market that shifts workers to jobs that in
fact better match their capabilities than would jobs formally requiring their own
level of education. The significance of skills is also illustrated by the fact that even in
strong CWB countries some of the wage effects of required education are explained
by underlying differences in skill levels. Again taking into account that this is a
conservative estimate of the effect of skills, the real explanatory effect of skills in
..........................................................................................................................................................................
relate it to a country’s correlation between years of schooling and numeracy skills. The absence of a
relationship makes it implausible that the results we present can be explained by country differences in
productivity, the proportion of higher status jobs, or the extent to which a country’s educational system
is related to the accumulation of skills.
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these countries is likely to be higher. This seems to suggest that even in a situation
of collective wage bargaining one of the arguments for assigning higher wages to
higher educational levels is because of the presumed higher skills levels.
In our third and fourth research questions, we asked to what extent there is
cross-national variation in the extent to which the relationship between wages, on
the one hand, and required education, overeducation, and undereducation, on the
other hand, can be explained by skills heterogeneity and to what extent this cross-
national variation is related to differences in labour market institutions. Although
cross-national variation exists, we clearly observe that in all countries, a consider-
able part of the wage effects of over- and undereducation is explained by hetero-
geneous skills. Notwithstanding this clear support for the heterogeneous skills
theory, we also find support for the institutional theory, which predicts that the
extent to which skills explain the wage effects of required education, overeducation,
and undereducation will depend strongly on the institutional context. In countries
with weak collective bargaining coverage, we find stronger direct effects of skills on
wages. Also, in these countries a larger proportion of the observed wage effects can
be accounted for by skills. By contrast, where CWB is more prevalent, skills have a
weaker direct effect on wages and account for relatively little of the wage effects of
required education, overeducation, and undereducation. It is hard to find an al-
ternative explanation for these observed effects of labour market institutions. All
countries in question are highly developed, and although there may be differences
in economic conditions, it is not immediately clear why numeracy skills affect
wages strongly in countries like Canada, Japan, and the UK and so weakly in
Italy or Cyprus. It is unlikely that some omitted skill variable might be responsible
for this. That would assume that for example in country X wages are strongly
related to skill A and in country Y it would be strongly related to skill B, with
little or no correlation between skills A and B. That seems quite unlikely, and we
think that it is plausible to infer from our findings that the extents to which
individual skills affect wages is constrained by the institutional arrangements. We
conclude that these observations make plausible that skills do matter in explaining
wage effects of education and educational mismatches, but that the extent to which
this is the case also depends on institutional contexts.
Our analyses have important policy implications. Policy makers often worry
about high incidences of educational mismatches, but our study shows that at
least part of the incidence of undereducation and overeducation should be inter-
preted as an adjustment by the market that shifts workers to jobs that in fact better
match their capabilities than would jobs formally requiring their own level of
education. Indirect evidence suggesting that this may be the case has already
been provided by Allen and van der Velden (2001), who argued that educational
mismatches do not necessarily imply skills mismatches and showed that the cor-
relation between educational mismatches and subjective feelings of over- and
underutilization are in fact quite weak. Our analyses now directly demonstrated
this using proper indicators for educational mismatches and objective measures of
skills. Nevertheless, in countries with strong CWB, these educational mismatches
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probably do represent over- or underutilization of skills, and here policy makers
should develop policies that allow for a better matching on the labour market.
Figure 3 shows how countries compare on the measure of collective wage
bargaining (y-axis) and the incidence of overeducation (x-axis). As expected we
can clearly see a negative relationship between the incidence of overeducation and
CWB. Most countries are located either in the upper left corner (combining a
relatively high CWB with a relatively low incidence of overeducation), or in the
lower right corner (combining a relatively low level of CWB with relatively high
levels of overeducation). In the first group of countries, workers are less likely to be
overeducated, as job allocation is often based on formal qualifications, but if they
are overeducated, they will have a higher chance that their skills are underutilized.
In the second group of countries, the reverse is true. Workers in these countries are
more likely to end up in jobs for which they are formally overqualified, but it is
relatively unlikely that their skills will be underutilized in those jobs. Institutional
characteristics like CWB thus work in two different ways: on one hand they protect
workers against the incidence of overeducation, but on the other hand they increase
the likelihood of ending up in jobs where the actual skills do not fully pay off. The
UK and South Korea stand out as countries where both the level of overeducation
Fig. 3 Relationship between collective wage bargaining and the prevalence of
overeducation.
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and the likelihood of underutilization of skills is the lowest. The opposite is
true for Spain, that represents the only country in the upper right corner,
combining both high levels of overeducation and a high likelihood of underutil-
ization of skills.
We analysed a unique and very rich data set to provide some answers to
questions that were raised more than a decade ago but remained largely
unanswered due to data limitations. This article is a first attempt to tackle this
issue, but many questions remain. Due to its cross-sectional nature, the PIAAC data
do not easily allow to derive causal explanations for the relations between
education, mismatches, and skills. As previous research has shown, overeducation
may also lead to cognitive decline, thus reversing the relation between skills and
overeducation (Grip et al., 2008). We need to look for proper indications in the
data to explore these causalities. It is also important to explore how these
mechanisms work for part-time employees. Most of the work on educational
mismatches has been done for full-time working men and it is not obvious
whether the same underlying mechanisms are at stake for part-time workers in
general and female part-timers in particular. Although the robustness check in this
analysis showed that the relations for full-time working women are not different,
we still need to explore how mismatch works out for part-timers. Future research
should explore this further.
Supplementary material
Supplementary material (the Appendix) is available online at the OUP website.
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